Overview: Caetano v. Massachusetts, 577 U.S. 411 (2016)

 

Jaime Caetano, a Massachusetts resident, dealt with repeated domestic abuse from a former boyfriend, which led her to obtain multiple restraining orders. Despite those restraining orders, she felt unsafe. She obtained a stun gun[1], which is an electronic weapon that can offer a measure of protection without lethal force. In 2011, Caetano was approached by law enforcement officers at a supermarket. The officers found the stun gun and arrested her for possession of a stun gun based on a Massachusetts statute[2] that forbids possession of stun guns within the state. She asserted that was carrying the stun gun only for self-defense purposes but she was still arrested and charged.

Caetano was convicted of that charge and subsequently appealed the conviction. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court upheld the conviction with the reasoning that stun guns do not have any protection under the Second Amendment of the United States Constitution[3]. The court noted that stun guns were not common during the founding era, so they were not allowed any protections under the Second Amendment. It also noted that stun guns were “dangerous per se,” which suggests that stun guns are inherently more harmful than what is considered an acceptable form of self-defense in the state. Finally, it found that stun guns are not considered “arms” under the Second Amendment because they cannot be readily adapted for military usage. Caetano appealed that decision.

The Supreme Court heard Caetano v. Massachusetts[4], which is a pivotal case that reaffirmed the meaning of the Second Amendment. It expanded the scope of the amendment in a way that upholds the nature of the amendment and modernizes it to reflect the non-lethal weapons that are currently available for self-defense in the United States. In its opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously reversed the decision of the Massachusetts court in a brief per curiam opinion, which means that the document is speaking on behalf of the court instead of speaking for specific justices.

The U.S. Supreme Court cited District of Columbia v. Heller[5], which was a case that led to the opinion that under the Second Amendment, individuals have a right to possess firearms that are not connected to militia service. Those firearms can be used for lawful purposes, which includes self-defense within the home. Heller also set the precedent that Second Amendment protections are extended to all bearable arms, not to only the ones that were in existence when the Second Amendment was created. Based on that case and the nature of the Second Amendment, the U.S. Supreme Court found that the reasoning of the lower court was inconsistent with the precedent set by Heller.

In Heller and Caetano, the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed that just because a weapon did not exist in the 18th century does not mean that it is not protected. It also noted that classifying a weapon as “unusual” because it does not have a military origin or was not used in the 1700s does not uphold the intent of the Amendment. The focus on the protection of a specific weapon must be on whether it is commonly used for lawful purposes, such as self-defense. This opinion reaffirms that laws must protect weapons in a manner that keeps up with technological advancements and the greater needs of society.

Justice Samuel Alito issued a concurring opinion. He was joined by Justice Clarence Thomas. The opinion expressed deep concern and the state’s action. It argued the Massachusetts essentially opted to criminalize a vulnerable woman’s attempt to use a nonlethal weapon for self-protection. The pointed stance criticized the decision to ignore the protections and intent of the Second Amendment. Justice Alito noted that the woman’s decision to carry a stun gun was necessary after other legal mechanisms failed to protect her. He argued that denying access to weapons like stun guns undermines the primary purpose of Second Amendment protections.

 



[1] Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 140, § 121 (2024).

[2] Mass. Acts 2018, ch. 123.

[3] U.S. Const. amend. II.

[4] Caetano v. Massachusetts, 577 U.S. 411 (2016).

[5] District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).